Chapter

Causation in Commonsense Realism

Johannes Roessler

in Perception, Causation, and Objectivity

Published in print August 2011 | ISBN: 9780199692040
Published online September 2011 | e-ISBN: 9780191729713 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199692040.003.0008

Series: Consciousness & Self-Consciousness Series

Causation in Commonsense Realism

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According to P.F. Strawson, a causal requirement on perception is implicit in everyday explanations of what someone knows in terms of what they perceive. In this paper I argue that this putative ‘rationale' for the causal theory of perception is premised on a questionable assumption, that making perceptual knowledge intelligible in terms of perception requires explaining our possession of reliably true perceptual beliefs. I present and defend an alternative interpretation of the commonsense psychology of perceptual knowledge, on which object perception is a causal enabling condition of epistemic perception. I also consider the bearing of this account on the relational view of perceptual experience.

Keywords: perceptual knowledge; causal theory of perception; objectivity; relational view of experience

Chapter.  9722 words. 

Subjects: Metaphysics

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