Chapter

Perceptual Concepts as Non-causal Concepts

Paul Snowdon

in Perception, Causation, and Objectivity

Published in print August 2011 | ISBN: 9780199692040
Published online September 2011 | e-ISBN: 9780191729713 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199692040.003.0009

Series: Consciousness & Self-Consciousness Series

Perceptual Concepts as Non-causal Concepts

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The question discussed is whether our perceptual concepts should be thought of as causal concepts. The notion of a causal concept is clarified, as is the nature of the question, and it is argued that there is insufficient evidence to support the claim that perceptual concepts are causal concepts. It is also argued that in the nature of the case it is very hard to demonstrate that the concepts are non-causal. Part of the evidence considered is that provided in earlier publications by Bill Child. An alternative, although partial, treatment of these concepts is sketched.

Keywords: causal concepts; causal theories of perception; objectivity; G.E.M. Anscombe; Bill Child

Chapter.  10484 words. 

Subjects: Metaphysics

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