Chapter

Perception and the Ontology of Causation

Helen Steward

in Perception, Causation, and Objectivity

Published in print August 2011 | ISBN: 9780199692040
Published online September 2011 | e-ISBN: 9780191729713 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199692040.003.0010

Series: Consciousness & Self-Consciousness Series

Perception and the Ontology of Causation

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The paper argues that the reconciliation of the Causal Theory of Perception with Disjunctivism requires the rejection of causal particularism – the idea that the ontology of causation is always and everywhere an ontology of particulars (e.g., events). The so-called ‘Humean Principle' that causes must be distinct from their effects is argued to be a genuine barrier to any purported reconciliation, provided causal particularism is retained; but extensive arguments are provided for the rejection of causal particularism. It is then explained how the reconciliation of the causal theory with disjunctivism can proceed on the basis of an ontology of facts.

Keywords: perception; causation; Causal Theory of Perception; disjunctivism; events; facts; Humean principle

Chapter.  11963 words. 

Subjects: Metaphysics

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