Chapter

Kosovo, the Serbian Surrender, and the Western Dilemma: Achieving Victories with Low Casualties

Michael Codner

in How Fighting Ends

Published in print July 2012 | ISBN: 9780199693627
Published online September 2012 | e-ISBN: 9780191741258 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199693627.003.0027
Kosovo, the Serbian Surrender, and the Western Dilemma: Achieving Victories with Low Casualties

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Western Powers after 1945 are under strict constraints to achieve their military victories with a minimum of own and also enemy casualties, because of their own and world public opinion which can delegitimize easily a military effort. The danger for modern states is to lose a war on the homefront; to lose political support. Western powers developed the concept of tailored airstrikes to lame the enemy and to sidestep this problem by being able to avoid costly offensives on the ground. The concept to force the enemy to surrender by deployment of air operations only was a further development of tactics first tried in the last months of the Second World War and is called EBO (Effect Based Operations). Michael Codner, head of RUSI, analyzes in his chapter how this concept worked — or did not work — to force former Yugoslavia to surrender in Kosovo.

Keywords: Kosovo; Yugoslavia; effect Based Operations; air warfare; NATO; russia

Chapter.  4888 words. 

Subjects: International Relations

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