Chapter

Moral concurrentism

Mark C. Murphy

in God and Moral Law

Published in print November 2011 | ISBN: 9780199693665
Published online January 2012 | e-ISBN: 9780191732010 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199693665.003.0007
Moral concurrentism

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This chapter makes the case for a moral concurrentist account of moral law and shows how it escapes the difficulties raised against standard natural law theory and theological voluntarism. The strategy is to employ the natural law view's characteristic account of moral necessitation — that what morally necessitates are human goods — while rejecting standard natural law theory's nontheistic account of goods. Rather, goods are to be understood along the lines defended by Adams, as likenesses to God, though unlike on Adams's view this theory of the good is cast in an Aristotelian rather than a Platonist way. Thus the desiderata for an adequate theistic explanation of morality are met: facts about God enter immediately into the explanation of every moral fact. The chapter concludes by considering objections that moral concurrentism cannot handle the phenomenon of moral obligation and that it cannot handle what Quinn calls ‘the immoralities of the patriarchs,’ cases in which God reverses the moral status of certain actions by an act of divine will.

Keywords: God; concurrentism; moral concurrentism; moral law; natural law; theological voluntarism; Adams; Quinn; moral obligation

Chapter.  15072 words. 

Subjects: Philosophy of Religion

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