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Chapter 5 is about definite descriptions. It begins with the observation that definites require specific restriction as a matter of convention, and explores the consequences of this fact for some major theories of definite descriptions, including Russellianism and neo-Fregeanism. The authors make a tentative case for a view on which definites are much like specific indefinites: they are existential quantifier phrases whose domain is presupposed to be restricted to a single individual (or plurality). That is, they are ‘specific existentials’, differing from specific indefinites only in their presuppositional profile.
Keywords: definite descriptions; uniqueness; familiarity; Russellianism; Gödelian restrictions; referential descriptions; incomplete descriptions; referential/attributive distinction; neo-Fregeanism
Chapter. 25125 words.
Subjects: Philosophy of Language
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