Idealism and Kantian Persons: Spinoza, Jacobi, and Schleiermacher

Karl Ameriks

in Kant's Elliptical Path

Published in print October 2012 | ISBN: 9780199693689
Published online January 2013 | e-ISBN: 9780191745584 | DOI:
Idealism and Kantian Persons: Spinoza, Jacobi, and Schleiermacher

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This chapter focuses on passages in Schleiermacher's notebooks, highlighted in recent work by Mari–a, which carefully describes similarities between Kant's Critical treatment of the self in the Paralogisms, and Spinoza's view, as interpreted by Jacobi, that finite subjects are not substances. Schleiermacher is right that there are striking similarities between Kant's and Spinoza's rejection of certain Cartesian doctrines about theoretical knowledge of the self. In the end, however, Kant's direct references to Spinoza and his own treatment of Jacobi reveal that Kant has long-standing differences with Spinozism about philosophical method, purpose, freedom, monism, and the reality of finite personal substances. The philosophical strength of these differences is difficult to evaluate, but they reveal Kant's enduring commitment to Rousseauian beliefs.

Keywords: persons; substance; monism; purpose; Spinoza; Schleiermacher; Jacobi; Mari–a

Chapter.  12022 words. 

Subjects: History of Western Philosophy

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