Is Practical Justification in Kant Ultimately Dogmatic?

Karl Ameriks

in Kant's Elliptical Path

Published in print October 2012 | ISBN: 9780199693689
Published online January 2013 | e-ISBN: 9780191745584 | DOI:
Is Practical Justification in Kant Ultimately Dogmatic?

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In the second Critique, Kant ultimately concedes that his practical philosophy rests on the notion of a ‘fact of reason’. This chapter explores and criticizes two valuable recent attempts, by Sussman and Kleingeld, to interpret Kant's discussions of morality's dominant authority in a less dogmatic way. They each have the goal of showing that Kant has arguments grounded on an aspect of rationality that is not already characterized as moral, and that therefore his view does not rest, after all, on acceptance of a pure, non-derived ‘fact’. The textual criticism of these subtle attempts admittedly leaves Kant's espousal of morality in a kind of dogmatic situation, without a foundational defense — although such a situation may be not only textually unavoidable but also realistic.

Keywords: practical reason; rationality; dogmatism; foundationalism; morality; Sussman; Kleingeld

Chapter.  10703 words. 

Subjects: History of Western Philosophy

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