Chapter

Ambiguities in the Will: Kant and Reinhold, <i>Briefe</i> II

Karl Ameriks

in Kant's Elliptical Path

Published in print October 2012 | ISBN: 9780199693689
Published online January 2013 | e-ISBN: 9780191745584 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199693689.003.0009
Ambiguities in the Will: Kant and Reinhold, Briefe II

Show Summary Details

Preview

This chapter assesses Kant's late debate with his former main ally, Reinhold, over the definition of the will. It concludes that, despite Kant's special emphasis on our absolute libertarian freedom, it was correct for him to criticize Reinhold's insistence on putting the liberty of multiple open sensory alternatives into the very definition of will. Even if human Willkür (choice) in fact has absolute liberty, pure will as such, Wille, which is practical reason and provides the standard for morality (and is common to God), is best defined as a pure positive faculty rather than in terms of indifference or the capacity to reject sensibility. This point reconfirms a non-foundationalist interpretation of the second Critique's notion of the ‘fact of reason’ and Kant's Critical philosophy in general.

Keywords: will; choice; indifference; practical reason; foundationalism; Reinhold

Chapter.  7806 words. 

Subjects: History of Western Philosophy

Full text: subscription required

How to subscribe Recommend to my Librarian

Buy this work at Oxford University Press »

Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content. Please, subscribe or login to access all content.