Chapter

Epistemic Scorekeeping

Patrick Rysiew

in Knowledge Ascriptions

Published in print May 2012 | ISBN: 9780199693702
Published online September 2012 | e-ISBN: 9780191741265 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199693702.003.0012
Epistemic Scorekeeping

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Edward Craig urged that instead of analyzing ‘knows’ and its cognates, we should ask, ‘what knowledge does for us, what its role in our life might be, and then ask what a concept having that role would be like’. An alternative to the Craigian account of the role of ‘know(s)’ (/KNOWS) — the certification view — is presented. (Though caution about whether there is such a thing as the such role is also recommended.) It is then argued that, contrary to initial appearances, a traditional (insensitive invariantist) semantics can explain knowledge ascriptions’ playing the ‘certifying’ role; whereas (and again, contrary to appearances), it’s not clear how well-equipped various non-traditional theories are to explain ‘know(s)’ playing that role. Overall, then: supposing that something like the certification view is correct, contrary to how it might seem, it’s far from clear that traditional invariantism is in trouble.

Keywords: invariantism; contextualism; certification; Craig; knowledge; action

Chapter.  12679 words. 

Subjects: Philosophy of Language

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