Chapter

Reasons: Practical and Adaptive

Joseph Raz

in From Normativity to Responsibility

Published in print December 2011 | ISBN: 9780199693818
Published online January 2012 | e-ISBN: 9780191731907 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199693818.003.0003
Reasons: Practical and Adaptive

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Introducing a distinction between standard and non-standard reasons, based on the ability to directly follow them, the chapter uses it to solve the ‘right kind of reason’ and the Toxin Puzzle, and to explain the difference between practical reasons and adaptive reasons, of which epistemic reasons are an instance. It then argues that normativity cannot be explained by its relationship to value because epistemic reasons are not related to value at all.

Keywords: standard reasons; adaptive reasons; epistemic reasons; practical reasons; evidence; following reasons; conforming with reasons; value; value of truth; value of knowledge; reasons for emotions

Chapter.  13702 words. 

Subjects: Moral Philosophy

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