Chapter

On the Guise of the Good

Joseph Raz

in From Normativity to Responsibility

Published in print December 2011 | ISBN: 9780199693818
Published online January 2012 | e-ISBN: 9780191731907 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199693818.003.0004
On the Guise of the Good

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The chapter examines the theses that intentional actions are actions performed for (normative) reasons, as those are seen by the agents; that reasons for action are such reasons by being facts that establish that the action has some value; and that intentional actions are actions taken in, and because of, a belief that there is some good in them. An examination of the nature of intentions and intentional actions leads to successive modification of the theses, concluding with a new position, a recognizable variant of the Guise of the Good Thesis, and true to its ambition of being a key to the explanation of intentions, and of actions for intentions.

Keywords: Guise of the Good; intention; independent intention; embedded intention; expressive action

Chapter.  14733 words. 

Subjects: Moral Philosophy

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