Chapter

The Myth of Instrumental Rationality<sup>1</sup>

Joseph Raz

in From Normativity to Responsibility

Published in print December 2011 | ISBN: 9780199693818
Published online January 2012 | e-ISBN: 9780191731907 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199693818.003.0008
The Myth of Instrumental Rationality1

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Facilitative reasons are explained. They are, it is claimed, what are often referred to as instrumental reasons. However, they are both wider and narrower than common accounts of instrumental reasons allow. On the one hand, they do not depend on anything being the agent’s goal (or intention), and on the other hand having goals or intentions does not generate reasons for the means for their realization. In the course of defending these claims the practical difference that goals may make is examined, and it is also argued that there is no reason to avoid a contradiction as such.

Keywords: instrumental reasons; rationality; facilitative reasons; goals; Jay Wallace; John Broome; Christine Korsgaard

Chapter.  18781 words. 

Subjects: Moral Philosophy

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