Chapter

Being in the World

Joseph Raz

in From Normativity to Responsibility

Published in print December 2011 | ISBN: 9780199693818
Published online January 2012 | e-ISBN: 9780191731907 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199693818.003.0012
Being in the World

Show Summary Details

Preview

We actively engage with the world through our actions. Among them those for which we are responsible hold a special place. They constitute our engagement with the world as rational agents, for we are responsible for actions in virtue of their relationship to our capacities of rational agency. The question of responsibility is largely the question: what is that relationship? Following some clarification of the sense of responsibility this part of the book is about, the chapter criticises three principles of responsibility: one takes us to be responsible only for our intentional actions, and for their intended or foreseen consequences, the second takes us to be responsible only for actions and outcomes that are under our control. The third, combining aspects of both, takes us to be responsible for actions that are guided by our powers of rational agency. It then takes a first step towards an alternative. It aims to show how our way of being in the world accounts for the conditions of responsibility, and dissolves the puzzle of so-called ‘moral luck’.

Keywords: Responsibility; intention; control; omission; negligence; rational agency; being in the world; moral luck

Chapter.  15236 words. 

Subjects: Moral Philosophy

Full text: subscription required

How to subscribe Recommend to my Librarian

Buy this work at Oxford University Press »

Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content. Please, subscribe or login to access all content.