Metaphilosophical Issues and Further Questions

Denis McManus

in Heidegger and the Measure of Truth

Published in print November 2012 | ISBN: 9780199694877
Published online January 2013 | e-ISBN: 9780191745706 | DOI:
Metaphilosophical Issues and Further Questions

Show Summary Details


Previous chapters provide a sense of why Heidegger claims that assertion ‘has not a primary cognitive function but only a secondary one’; but they also cast doubt on an important construal of Heidegger's repeated depiction of assertions as ‘secondary’ in the activity of the philosopher too. The present chapter explains how that earlier discussion suggests another construal of that depiction. It identifies a problem that the idea of ‘original havings’ raises and which the project Heidegger envisaged for Being and time may have attempted (unsuccessfully) to address; but it also identifies another metaphilosophical vision at work in Heidegger's texts which avoids that problem and suggests a novel understanding of his attitude towards philosophical propositions. The chapter explains how this vision, which focuses on a needed ‘reminding’ of our ‘understanding of Being’, can be seen at work in earlier discussion; but it also stresses the turmoil of Heidegger's early metaphilosophical reflections.

Keywords: metaphilosophy; assertion; proposition; original having; being; time; reminding; forgetting of being; measure; authenticity

Chapter.  8490 words. 

Subjects: History of Western Philosophy

Full text: subscription required

How to subscribe Recommend to my Librarian

Buy this work at Oxford University Press »

Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content. Please, subscribe or login to access all content.