Chapter

Truth, Deflationism, and the T-schema

Gary Kemp

in Quine versus Davidson

Published in print February 2012 | ISBN: 9780199695621
Published online May 2012 | e-ISBN: 9780191738524 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199695621.003.0004
Truth, Deflationism, and the T-schema

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Some theorists postulate that a Davidsonian theory of meaning is relatively unsubstantive, as it can make do with deflationism as regards truth. This chapter largely aims to discredit this idea. The deflationist theory of truth cannot fulfill certain central functions that are essential to Davidson’s semantics: it cannot cope with cross‐language uses of ‘true’; it cannot account for the truth of sentences involving indexicals; and it is, as Tarski essentially said, incapable of proving certain evidently true true‐involving sentences, which is in turn shown to obstruct the expressive adequacy of the truth‐predicate. Tarskian accounts of truth can also be considered deflationist and in a sense non‐transcendental, but ultimately the theory is insufficient for Davidson’s purposes. Davidson requires truth to be regarded as primitive, substantial and transcendental. This is in stark contrast with Quine’s less ambitious, ‘immanent’ view of truth. This reaches a head when we consider the standard liar paradox, which it appears Davidson cannot escape.

Keywords: truth; deflationism; Tarski; indexicals; expressive adequacy; transcendental; Davidson; Quine; liar paradox

Chapter.  15808 words. 

Subjects: Philosophy of Language

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