Chapter

Causation, Free Will, and Naturalism<sup>1</sup>

Jenann Ismael

in Scientific Metaphysics

Published in print January 2013 | ISBN: 9780199696499
Published online January 2013 | e-ISBN: 9780191744983 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199696499.003.0010
Causation, Free Will, and Naturalism1

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This chapter addresses the worry that the existence of causal antecedents to your choices means that you are causally compelled to act as you do. It begins with the folk notion of cause, leads the reader through recent developments in the scientific understanding of causal concepts, and argues that those developments undermine the threat from causal antecedents. The discussion is then used as a model for a kind of naturalistic metaphysics that takes its lead from science, letting everyday concepts be shaped and transformed by scientific developments.

Keywords: Free will; causal antecedents; scientific developments; interventionism; naturalistic metaphysics

Chapter.  11130 words.  Illustrated.

Subjects: Metaphysics

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