Chapter

Universalism and the Problem of Hell

Jonathan L Kvanvig

in Destiny and Deliberation

Published in print October 2011 | ISBN: 9780199696574
Published online May 2012 | e-ISBN: 9780191732270 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199696574.003.0003
Universalism and the Problem of Hell

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This chapter begins by first distinguishing versions of universalism in terms of modal status. Contingent universalism holds that, though it is possible that a person end up in Hell as described by the conjunction of (H2)-(H4), as a matter of contingent fact every human being will end up in Heaven. Necessary universalism holds that it is not only true but necessarily true that every human being will end up in Heaven; it is simply impossible that anyone be damned. It is argued that both versions fail to solve the problem of Hell; that contingent universalism is too weak to solve the problem and necessary universalism is too strong. The chapter then turns to the question of whether there is any adequate middle ground between these two positions.

Keywords: hell; universalists; contingent universalism; necessary universalism

Chapter.  11741 words. 

Subjects: Philosophy of Religion

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