Chapter

Seeking Truth

Isaac Levi

in Pragmatism and Inquiry

Published in print August 2012 | ISBN: 9780199698134
Published online January 2013 | e-ISBN: 9780191742323 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199698134.003.0008
Seeking Truth

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Three well-known contemporary philosophers have recently exchanged views concerning truth as an aim of inquiry. One of them, Richard Rorty, has staked out a claim to be a disciple of Dewey. The other two, Crispin Wright and Donald Davidson, have never decamped from the community of analytic philosophers. Wright holds that aiming at truth is necessarily equivalent to aiming at warranted assertibility although success in the one is not the same as success in the other. Rorty denies that we should aim at truth except insofar as that means aiming at warranted assertibility. Davidson supplements this with insistence that it is incoherent to seek truth when truth is not equated with warranted assertibility. None of these claims are acceptable if one takes the project of the classical pragmatists seriously.

Keywords: warranted assertibility; aiming at truth; Richard Porty; Crispin Wright; Donald Davidson

Chapter.  10289 words. 

Subjects: Metaphysics

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