Chapter

The Logic of Consistency and The Logic of Truth

Isaac Levi

in Pragmatism and Inquiry

Published in print August 2012 | ISBN: 9780199698134
Published online January 2013 | e-ISBN: 9780191742323 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199698134.003.0009
The Logic of Consistency and The Logic of Truth

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In “Truth and Probability” Ramsey claimed that the logic of consistency for probability is not a logic of truth. After supporting this claim, he proceeded to explore the possibilities for a logic of truth for probability. An examination of Ramsey’s intent reveals that Ramsey was far from being an subjectivist Bayesian when it comes to statistical reasoning. He explored the issues pertaining to direct inference from information about statistical probabilities to judgments of credal probability including problems generated by reference classes. The relations between Ramsey’s thought and the ideas of Keynes and Peirce on this score are discussed.

Keywords: logic; consistency for probability; truth for probability; direct inference; reference classes

Chapter.  9806 words. 

Subjects: Metaphysics

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