Chapter

Knowledge as True Full Belief

Isaac Levi

in Pragmatism and Inquiry

Published in print August 2012 | ISBN: 9780199698134
Published online January 2013 | e-ISBN: 9780191742323 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199698134.003.0012
Knowledge as True Full Belief

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In the opening chapter of Enterprise of Knowledge, written by the same author as this book, it was argued that characterizing knowledge as true full belief gave expression to an epistemic ideal that, so it was claimed, Peirce and James had suggested. An inquirer’s full beliefs serve as his or her standard for serious possibility. Such a standard ought to be as informative as the budget of inquiries in which the inquirer is engaged and be free of error. Not only was pedigree epistemology jettisoned, but a conception of knowledge tied to the function of knowledge in inquiry proposed. In the 1990s, Edward Craig and Philip Kitcher proposed accounts of knowledge that appealed to another function beliefs can have in inquiry—as a source of reliable information. This chapter explains the difference between these views of the function of knowledge, argues for the view that knowledge is true full belief, and reviews a few other contemporary accounts of knowledge.

Keywords: knowledge; belief; serious possibility; Edward Craig; Philip Kitcher

Chapter.  18515 words. 

Subjects: Metaphysics

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