Chapter

Hegel on the “Subjectivity” of Kant’s Idealism

Sally Sedgwick

in Hegel's Critique of Kant

Published in print March 2012 | ISBN: 9780199698363
Published online May 2012 | e-ISBN: 9780191738692 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199698363.003.0004
Hegel on the “Subjectivity” of Kant’s Idealism

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Hegel argues that Kant’s account of human discursivity suffers from ‘subjectivity’, and that this subjectivity is responsible for the skeptical implications of his idealism. We appreciate the true nature of human cognition, in Hegel’s view, only if we give up the subjectivity of our idealism. As Hegel suggests, this is a matter of recognizing that just as nature is ‘subject-object’ and thus an ‘immanent ideality,’ so is subjectivity ‘subject-object’ and thus an ‘immanent reality.’ In this chapter, it is proposed that the subjectivity Hegel takes to be ultimately responsible for the skeptical implications of Kant’s idealism is tied to a particular conception of subjective form (and of the faculty or faculties that bring that form into being). On this conception, form is ‘absolutely opposed’ to content in this respect: it is taken to owe nothing of its nature and origin to the realm of the empirical.

Keywords: cognition; discursivity; idealism; immanent ideality; immanent reality; skepticism; subjective form; subjectivity

Chapter.  16115 words. 

Subjects: History of Western Philosophy

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