Chapter

Hegel on the Transcendental Deduction of the first <i>Critique</i>

Sally Sedgwick

in Hegel's Critique of Kant

Published in print March 2012 | ISBN: 9780199698363
Published online May 2012 | e-ISBN: 9780191738692 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199698363.003.0005
Hegel on the Transcendental Deduction of the first Critique

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This chapter identifies ‘speculative’ elements Hegel claims to discover in Kant’s Transcendental Deduction, elements he believes Kant himself failed to appreciate. That is, Hegel discovers resources in the Transcendental Deduction for overcoming the heterogeneity of concept and intuition. In his view, the idea of identity is, for example, implicit in Kant’s conception of the faculty of the original synthetic unity of apperception. This chapter provides further evidence that the identity Hegel claims to discover in the Transcendental Deduction is achieved neither by a reduction of concepts to intuitions, nor by a reduction of intuitions to concepts. The lesson Hegel believes we should ultimately derive from the Transcendental Deduction is that we need a new and non-Kantian account of the nature and origin of conceptual form.

Keywords: apperception; concept; intuition; speculative; subjectivity; Transcendental Deduction

Chapter.  16443 words. 

Subjects: History of Western Philosophy

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