Chapter

Subjectivity as Part of an Original Identity

Sally Sedgwick

in Hegel's Critique of Kant

Published in print March 2012 | ISBN: 9780199698363
Published online May 2012 | e-ISBN: 9780191738692 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199698363.003.0006
Subjectivity as Part of an Original Identity

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Further evidence is provided in this chapter in support of the thesis that Hegel rejects Kant’s account of conceptual form. We avoid subjective idealism, according to Hegel, only if we reject the Kantian assumption of the ‘externality’ of conceptual form. The Hegelian charge that Kant is committed to the ‘externality’ of conceptual form is clarified with reference to discussions in the Logic and the Phenomenology of Kant’s project of critique. The chapter concludes by suggesting features of Hegel’s alternative account of cognition. For Hegel, our concepts are never wholly ‘external’ because human reason is incapable of total detachment: it cannot free itself of presuppositions that tie it to ‘common reality’.

Keywords: common reality; conceptual form; critique; externality; subjective idealism

Chapter.  19769 words. 

Subjects: History of Western Philosophy

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