Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference<sup>*</sup>

Saul A. Kripke

in Philosophical Troubles

Published in print December 2011 | ISBN: 9780199730155
Published online January 2012 | e-ISBN: 9780199918430 | DOI:
Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference*

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This chapter discusses some issues inspired by a well-known paper of Keith Donnellan, “Reference and Definite Descriptions,”. Donnellan's paper claims to give decisive objections both to Russell's theory of definite descriptions (taken as a theory about English) and to Strawson's. The chapter' concern is not primarily with the question: is Donnellan right, or is Russell (or Strawson)? Rather, it is with the question: do the considerations in Donnellan's paper refute Russell's theory (or Strawson's)? For definiteness, it focuses on Donnellan versus Russell, leaving Strawson aside. And about this issue it draws a definite conclusion, one which will illuminate a few methodological maxims about language.

Keywords: Keith Donnellan; Reference and Definite Descriptions; Russell; Strawson; philosophy of language

Chapter.  14510 words. 

Subjects: Philosophy

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