Chapter

Unrestricted Exportation and Some Morals for the Philosophy of Language*

Kripke Saul A.

in Philosophical Troubles

Published in print December 2011 | ISBN: 9780199730155
Published online January 2012 | e-ISBN: 9780199918430 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199730155.003.0011
Unrestricted Exportation and Some Morals for the Philosophy of Language*

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This chapter discusses a distinction that has a fairly long history in philosophy. In the contemporary discussion of intensional discourse it really should be attributed to Bertrand Russell in “On Denoting,” (1905) but got much more attention when it was revived by Quine in his paper “Quantifiers and Propositional Attitudes” (1956) and in his book Word and Object (1960). Russell and Quine gave different accounts of the matter. But the problem was the same. As Quine pointed out, there appears to be an important distinction between (1) and the weaker (2) as follows: (1) There is someone I believe to be a spy. (2) I believe that there are spies. While (2) expresses a triviality, (1) expresses important information that might be communicated to, say, the CIA. Now, (1) is, of course, a quantified sentence. A semiformal version is obtained by prefixing an existential quantifier to (3): (3) I believe of y that he is a spy. Or, in conformity with (1), prefixing an existential quantifier to (3a): (3a) I believe y to be a spy. Using standard terminology, (1) and (3) are examples of de re belief and (2) of de dicto belief.

Keywords: distinction; philosophy of language; Quine; Russell; de re belief; de dicto belief

Chapter.  16297 words. 

Subjects: Philosophy

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