Institutions, Lobbying, and Corruption: A Theoretical Framework

Vineeta Yadav

in Political Parties, Business Groups, and Corruption in Developing Countries

Published in print March 2011 | ISBN: 9780199735907
Published online May 2011 | e-ISBN: 9780199894789 | DOI:
Institutions, Lobbying, and Corruption: A Theoretical Framework

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This chapter presents a theoretical framework that analyzes how differences in the lobbying strategies of business interest groups emerge from differences in their legislative institutions, establishes the link between these institutionally inspired lobbying strategies and patterns of corrupt behaviors, and analyzes which of these patterns is more likely to lead to higher political and general corruption. It argues that countries with legislative institutions that incentivize lobbying directed at political parties will experience higher corruption than those countries that incentivize lobbying directed at individual legislators. This is the central hypothesis of this book.

Keywords: lobbying; business interest groups; legislative institutions; corrupt behavior

Chapter.  16049 words.  Illustrated.

Subjects: Comparative Politics

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