Chapter

Legislative Institutions, Party Control, and Corruption: The Empirical Evidence

Vineeta Yadav

in Political Parties, Business Groups, and Corruption in Developing Countries

Published in print March 2011 | ISBN: 9780199735907
Published online May 2011 | e-ISBN: 9780199894789 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199735907.003.0006
Legislative Institutions, Party Control, and Corruption: The Empirical Evidence

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This chapter reports results from the large-n empirical analysis used to evaluate the three hypotheses regarding the impact of legislative rules on corruption for a sample of sixty-four developing country democracies from 1984 to 2004. It discusses in detail the operationalization of the independent variables and then presents the statistical results obtained from testing the effects of three legislative rules on corruption. It illustrates the substantive effect of party control of agenda-setting, amendments, and voting on bills on corruption. The results from the large-n empirical analysis provide robust support for the broader implications derived from theoretical arguments.

Keywords: legislative rules; developing countries; operationalization; corruption

Chapter.  14024 words.  Illustrated.

Subjects: Comparative Politics

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