Jody Azzouni

in Talking About Nothing

Published in print September 2010 | ISBN: 9780199738946
Published online September 2010 | e-ISBN: 9780199866175 | DOI:

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It’s common to think that demonstrations require something (that exists) that’s demonstrated. If, because of hallucination, there is no object, then the demonstration—and what’s said—is seen by some to fail to express anything. One can pretend (in the case where one is aware that one is hallucinating) that one is pointing at something, and others can pretend to understand what the hallucinator is talking about. This chapter shows that this way of thinking about hallucinations is wrong by developing at length a series of thought experiments that show how natural and cogent demonstrations are in hallucinatory contexts. Gareth Evans’s careful discussion of this matter is analyzed. Pretence approaches to singular hallucinatory talk are undercut by the external discourse demand, and by quantifying-in requirements on that discourse. The chapter also discusses how identity conditions for hallucinated objects can be cogent, and the argument from hallucination.

Keywords: hallucination; empty demonstratives; Gareth Evans; pretence; external discourse demand; quantifying in; truth-value inducers; the argument from hallucination; disjunctivism; truth-based properties

Chapter.  34801 words. 

Subjects: Philosophy

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