Chapter

Introduction to Part II

Jody Azzouni

in Talking About Nothing

Published in print September 2010 | ISBN: 9780199738946
Published online September 2010 | e-ISBN: 9780199866175 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199738946.003.0005
Introduction to Part II

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This introduction takes notes of the fact that we have many different kinds of discourses—moral discourse, mathematical discourse, scientific discourse, fictional discourse, and so on—and that one response to this has been various pluralist doctrines: pluralism about logic, about metaphysics, and about truth. The external discourse demand and the rejection of Quine’s criterion, and a companion doctrine about singular idioms can be used against the various pluralist views. Crucial in the attack is the fact that statements from a discourse-domain can be brought to bear evidentially and deductively to establish and refute statements in quite different discourse-domains. It is a puzzle how this is possible, one which it is promised will be resolved in part II, and specifically in chapter 4.

Keywords: truth pluralism; logical pluralism; metaphysical pluralism; external discourse demand; Quine’s criterion; singular idioms; unity of science

Chapter.  2357 words. 

Subjects: Philosophy

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