Chapter

Introduction

Uriah Kriegel

in The Sources of Intentionality

Published in print August 2011 | ISBN: 9780199742974
Published online September 2011 | e-ISBN: 9780199914449 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199742974.003.0000

Series: Philosophy of Mind Series

Introduction

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A generation ago, the problem of intentionality was at the center of activity in the philosophy of mind. Indeed, the project of finding a place for intentionality in the natural order—“naturalizing intentionality”—consumed more intellectual energy than virtually any other issue in philosophy. Yet today the naturalizing intentionality research program generates almost no discernible activity. Why the remarkable turnaround? This chapter considers two possible explanations. One is that the exciting part of the research program has been exhausted, and successfully so, with only technical issues remaining to be resolved. The other is less sanguine: that the naturalizing intentionality research program bears all the hallmarks of a degenerating research program, and the reason for this is that it ignores entirely the role of phenomenal consciousness and the first-person perspective in its theorizing about intentionality.

Keywords: intentionality; naturalizing; consciousness

Chapter.  2062 words. 

Subjects: Philosophy of Mind

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