The Nature of Experiential Intentionality

Uriah Kriegel

in The Sources of Intentionality

Published in print August 2011 | ISBN: 9780199742974
Published online September 2011 | e-ISBN: 9780199914449 | DOI:

Series: Philosophy of Mind Series

The Nature of Experiential Intentionality

Show Summary Details


Developing a philosophical account of experiential intentionality requires answering the following question: For any mental state x and property F, what would make it the case that F figures in the experiential-intentional content of x? This chapters discuss tracking accounts of experiential intentionality (Section 2.1), goes on to argue against such accounts (Section 2.2), and then formulates and defends a higher-order tracking theory (Section 2.3), before closing with some objections and replies (Section 2.4). According to the higher-order tracking theory, a property F figures in the experiential-intentional content of a state x just in case x is suitably higher-order tracked to track F. What this exactly means becomes clearer in the course of the chapter. The overall thesis of this chapter is that although the standard tracking theory is rather implausible, the higher-order tracking theory is quite plausible.

Keywords: experiential intentionality; tracking; higher-rrder theory; mental representation; informational semantics; self-representationalism

Chapter.  27629 words. 

Subjects: Philosophy of Mind

Full text: subscription required

How to subscribe Recommend to my Librarian

Buy this work at Oxford University Press »

Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content. Please, subscribe or login to access all content.