Chapter

The Nature of Non-Experiential Intentionality

Uriah Kriegel

in The Sources of Intentionality

Published in print August 2011 | ISBN: 9780199742974
Published online September 2011 | e-ISBN: 9780199914449 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199742974.003.0004

Series: Philosophy of Mind Series

The Nature of Non-Experiential Intentionality

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Developing a philosophical account of experiential intentionality requires answering the following question: For any item x and property F, what would make it the case that F figures in the non-experiential-intentional content of x? This chapter considers four possible answers to this question, defending and developing the fourth among them, which is an interpretivist account. According to the proposed account, a property F figures in the non-experiential-intentional content of a state x just in case an ideal interpreter would, under ideal conditions, interpret x as having F in its intentional content. The chapter first discusses a ‘potentialist’ approach developed by Searle (Section 4.1), then an ‘inferentialist’ approach developed by Loar (Section 4.2) and an ‘eliminativist’ approach defended by Strawson (Section 4.3), and finally the ‘interpretivist’ approach it defends as superior (Section 4.4).

Keywords: non-experiential intentionality; intentional stance; interpretation; linguistic intentionality

Chapter.  17629 words. 

Subjects: Philosophy of Mind

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