Chapter

Toward a General Theory of Intentionality

Uriah Kriegel

in The Sources of Intentionality

Published in print August 2011 | ISBN: 9780199742974
Published online September 2011 | e-ISBN: 9780199914449 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199742974.003.0005

Series: Philosophy of Mind Series

Toward a General Theory of Intentionality

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A “general theory of intentionality” is one that tells us, for any intentional item whatsoever, what makes it an intentional item at all (rather than a non-intentional item) and what makes it the intentional item it is (rather than a different intentional item). Thus it addresses the following question: For any intentional item x and property F, what would make it the case that F figures in the intentional content of x? An answer to this question can be obtained by combining the results of previous chapters. The chapter considers two answers: the first combines the higher-order tracking theory of experiential intentionality with the interpretivist theory of non-experiential intentionality (Section 5.1), the second combines the adverbial theory of experiential intentionality with the interpretivist theory of non-experiential intentionality (Section 5.2).

Keywords: intentionality; adverbialism; higher-order theory; interpretation

Chapter.  12011 words. 

Subjects: Philosophy of Mind

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