From defaults to reasons

John F. Horty

in Reasons as Defaults

Published in print April 2012 | ISBN: 9780199744077
Published online September 2012 | e-ISBN: 9780199932566 | DOI:
From defaults to reasons

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The goal of this chapter is to show how default logic can be adapted to serve as a foundation for a concrete theory of reasons. The previous chapter talked loosely of a correspondence between default rules and reasons. Having introduced a number of technical concepts in the course of developing our simple default logic, this chapter considers this correspondence in more detail, as well as the overall account of reasons that emerges from the underlying default logic.

Keywords: defaults; reasons; austere theory of reasons; conflict; strength; defeat; rebutting defeat; enablers

Chapter.  11776 words.  Illustrated.

Subjects: Philosophy of Mathematics and Logic

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