Chapter

Reasons and oughts

John F. Horty

in Reasons as Defaults

Published in print April 2012 | ISBN: 9780199744077
Published online September 2012 | e-ISBN: 9780199932566 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199744077.003.0003
Reasons and oughts

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The goal of this chapter is to explain how the various reasons at work in a situation can support conclusions about what an agent ought to do—in the language of Ross, how prima facie duties, or prima facie oughts, can lead to all things considered oughts. This chapter describes a systematic procedure, applicable in the broad range of ordinary cases, through which ought statements can be derived from default theories and the reasons they provide. Indeed, the chapter presents two such procedures—two deontic logics—one that allows for the possibility of conflicting all things considered oughts and one that does not.

Keywords: reasons; ought statements; oughts; deontic logic

Chapter.  10934 words.  Illustrated.

Subjects: Philosophy of Mathematics and Logic

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