Chapter

Knowledge of Perception

Daniel Stoljar

in Introspection and Consciousness

Published in print July 2012 | ISBN: 9780199744794
Published online September 2012 | e-ISBN: 9780199933396 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199744794.003.0003

Series: Philosophy of Mind Series

Knowledge of Perception

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According to Fred Dretske’ evidence argument I cannot know that that I am seeing my son (and other simple first-personal present tense psychological facts). However, since I can and do know these things, something is wrong with the evidence argument. What? I suggest that the argument overlooks a distinction between evidential and explanatory readings of its key phrases. However, I also suggest that in order to defend this diagnosis, one must acknowledge a significant element of rationality in the relevant notion of explanation. This chapter closes by comparing my proposal with an alternative.

Keywords: knowledge; evidence; perception; introspection; self-knowledge; Dretske

Chapter.  12810 words. 

Subjects: Philosophy of Mind

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