Chapter

Self-Knowledge, ‘Transparency’, and the Forms of Activity

Richard Moran

in Introspection and Consciousness

Published in print July 2012 | ISBN: 9780199744794
Published online September 2012 | e-ISBN: 9780199933396 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199744794.003.0008

Series: Philosophy of Mind Series

Self-Knowledge, ‘Transparency’, and the Forms of Activity

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In philosophy, the ideas of self-consciousness and rational agency are often discussed together. Some contemporary accounts appeal to the so-called ‘transparency’ of belief (and other attitudes) to argue that the ordinary capacity for self-knowledge should be understood an expression of rational agency. Recently, certain authors defending the appeal to transparency have argued that this should be detached from the idea of rational agency. This chapter seeks to defend and explain this connection, in part by distinguishing the relevant notion of agency or activity here from related notions of ‘managerial control’, choice, or belief voluntarism.

Keywords: self-knowledge; self-consciousness; transparency; agency; Shoemaker; Byrne; Velleman; Shah

Chapter.  13702 words. 

Subjects: Philosophy of Mind

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