Chapter

Introspection, Explanation, and Perceptual Experience: Resisting Metaphysical Disjunctivism

Aaron Zimmerman

in Introspection and Consciousness

Published in print July 2012 | ISBN: 9780199744794
Published online September 2012 | e-ISBN: 9780199933396 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199744794.003.0013

Series: Philosophy of Mind Series

Introspection, Explanation, and Perceptual Experience: Resisting Metaphysical Disjunctivism

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According to metaphysical disjunctivists, veridical visual experience and hallucination do not have a common nature. The chapter argues that disjunctivism so defined is incompatible with common sense views of introspection and psychological explanation. The preponderance of evidence therefore points away from metaphysical disjunctivism toward a view on which hallucinatory and veridical visual experiences are representations of a common kind. To focus the discussion, the arguments are directed at the metaphysical form of disjunctivism defended by Michael Martin (2006).

Keywords: disjunctivism; introspection; self-knowledge; visual experience; hallucination; psychological explanation; representationalism; seeing

Chapter.  12655 words. 

Subjects: Philosophy of Mind

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