Chapter

Staggering to the Finish

Gregory A. Daddis

in No Sure Victory

Published in print May 2011 | ISBN: 9780199746873
Published online September 2011 | e-ISBN: 9780199897179 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199746873.003.0009
Staggering to the Finish

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This final chapter concentrates on the final two years of U.S. Army participation in Vietnam, 1971–1972. It first considers any refinements made to counterinsurgency theory since the early 1960s and asks if these changes affected how MACV measured its effectiveness and progress late in the war. MACV revised HES in 1970 to overcome biases in reporting. Were other reports revised to account for biases or changes in counterinsurgency theory? From the operational standpoint, the army conducted operations in Laos and Cambodia, expanding the war effort to allow Vietnamization to work and the American army to withdraw from Southeast Asia. How did MACV assess these operations? Did MACV believe the final battles of the war to be a validation of Vietnamization? By the end of 1972, did MACV believe, based on its metrics, that it had successfully completed its mission in South Vietnam?

Keywords: Laos; Cambodia; Vietnamization; counterinsurgency theory; HES 70

Chapter.  9047 words.  Illustrated.

Subjects: International Relations

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