Chapter

Conclusion

Gregory A. Daddis

in No Sure Victory

Published in print May 2011 | ISBN: 9780199746873
Published online September 2011 | e-ISBN: 9780199897179 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199746873.003.0010
Conclusion

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The work concludes by assessing MACV’s decisions and choices in developing and implementing counterinsurgency metrics of effectiveness and progress in Vietnam. In the end, it asks if the army was an organization with a deeply flawed mentality that sought to impose measurements on the immeasurable. It also provides historical perspective for those armies currently attempting to measure their own successes and failures in an unconventional environment.

Keywords: MACV; counterinsurgency metrics; army effectiveness; unconventional warfare; Vietnam War

Chapter.  5299 words. 

Subjects: International Relations

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