Chapter

How Should We Understand Implicit and Explicit Processes in Scientific Thinking?

Donelson E. Dulany

in Psychology of Science

Published in print July 2012 | ISBN: 9780199753628
Published online September 2012 | e-ISBN: 9780199950027 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199753628.003.0009
How Should We Understand Implicit and Explicit Processes in Scientific Thinking?

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The question posed in the title leads into several levels of development in the psychology of science. At one level, the standard cognitive theory of the conscious explicit and unconscious implicit is contrasted with a mentalistic theory in which deliberative (explicit) and evocative (implicit) mental episodes carry different forms of conscious contents interrelated by different forms of nonconscious mental operations. Supporting research shows the role of awareness in both forms of learning and the superiority of the deliberative in handling novelty. Other research shows deliberative processing in causal learning. At another level, the question calls for a deliberative logic of competitive support, especially when the issues involve realistically interpreted constructs and strong controversy. At still another level, it is argued that various metatheoretical and ideological positions have led to the standard cognitive view and continue to inspire conceptual and methodological limitations and biases that have provided support for the view.

Keywords: standard cognitive theory; implicit processes; explicit processes; awareness; deliberative mental episodes; evocative mental episodes; consciousness; unconsciousness; competitive support

Chapter.  12782 words. 

Subjects: Cognitive Psychology

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