Chapter

Is Kant’s Theory Consistent?

Patricia Kitcher

in Kant’s Thinker

Published in print January 2011 | ISBN: 9780199754823
Published online January 2011 | e-ISBN: 9780199855889 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199754823.003.0012
Is Kant’s Theory Consistent?

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This chapter defends Kant’s theory of cognition and apperception against a venerable and potentially devastating criticism: His theory is inconsistent, because the subject and objects of cognition can be neither phenomenal nor noumenal, but by his metaphysical theory, all things must be one or the other. Through analyzing some crucial passages where Kant became confused about how to describe the origins of cognition, I argue that he is consistent that the objects and subjects of cognition are phenomena.

Keywords: phenomenal/noumenal distinction; origins of cognition; consistency of Kant’s theory

Chapter.  6944 words. 

Subjects: History of Western Philosophy

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