Chapter

Objections to the Fast and Frugal School Program*

Mark Kelman

in The Heuristics Debate

Published in print March 2011 | ISBN: 9780199755608
Published online May 2011 | e-ISBN: 9780199895236 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199755608.003.0005
Objections to the Fast and Frugal School Program*

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H&B scholars suspect that F&F researchers do not so much describe cognitive processes in careful detail as imagine processes that would serve imputed adaptive ends. For instance, the F&F description of the basic cognitive capacity that recognition heuristic users purportedly employ in judging all familiar items bigger or better than unfamiliar ones—the capacity to make dichotomous item familiarity judgments—is substantially misleading. H&B theorists further doubt that heuristics users will almost invariably outperform those using conventional rational choice strategies. For instance, people who use one-cue decision-making methods will get the wrong answer in a large class of fairly simple city size assessment tests: they will think that familiar tiny towns near their homes are bigger than state capitals they have not heard of. But H&B theorists disagree that people invariably use these single cue strategies: for instance, nearly no experimental subjects actually use recognition information lexically when asked to compare the size of known small towns with unknown state capitals.

Keywords: fast and frugal heuristics; critique of fast and frugal heuristics; recognition heuristic; recognition and recall memory; lexical decision making; variation in heuristic use; adaptive toolbox

Chapter.  12972 words. 

Subjects: Jurisprudence and Philosophy of Law

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