This chapter begins by considering the relation of advising to the exercise of judicial power and to the legitimacy of that exercise. It argues that advising, far from being merely a bland service to those in power, carries inherent political tensions and is itself an exercise of power that asserts a kind of balance of power. Surprisingly little studied and without a significant place in political theory, the relation of advising to power is prominent in political narratives from earliest times, and treated as central by such writers as Machiavelli and Hobbes. The latter part of this chapter...

This chapter begins by considering the relation of advising to the exercise of judicial power and to the legitimacy of that exercise. It argues that advising, far from being merely a bland service to those in power, carries inherent political tensions and is itself an exercise of power that asserts a kind of balance of power. Surprisingly little studied and without a significant place in political theory, the relation of advising to power is prominent in political narratives from earliest times, and treated as central by such writers as Machiavelli and Hobbes. The latter part of this chapter accounts for the earliest appearance of a constitutional provision establishing advisory opinions, in the Massachusetts constitution of 1780 drafted by John Adams, relating it to the controversy over plural office holding. The chapter then offers an account of the creation of each of the advisory opinion provisions.