Chapter

Fictionalism

Christopher Pincock

in Mathematics and Scientific Representation

Published in print January 2012 | ISBN: 9780199757107
Published online May 2012 | e-ISBN: 9780199932313 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199757107.003.0012

Series: Oxford Studies in the Philosophy of Science

Fictionalism

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Fictionalism about mathematics is the view that we can use mathematics in science and yet not believe that our mathematical claims are true. This chapter critically evaluates some of the most important versions of fictionalism. It begins by considering the leading options for making sense of literary fictions and argues that engaging with a literary fiction does not present any evidence for how things are in the real world. This point is then used to criticize fictionalism about mathematics and a related fictionalist position about scientific models. Another objection is that the fictionalist has yet to clarify the rules for exporting well-supported claims from the fiction in the scientific case. This suggests that fictionalists are not able to make sense of the contributions delineated in part one of the book.

Keywords: literary fiction; anti-realism about fiction; pretense; scientific models

Chapter.  11529 words. 

Subjects: Philosophy of Science

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