Joel Peters

in Exit Strategies and State Building

Published in print September 2012 | ISBN: 9780199760114
Published online January 2013 | e-ISBN: 9780199949991 | DOI:

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In December 2003, Israel’s prime minister, Ariel Sharon, announced that Israel would withdraw unilaterally from Gaza and dismantle all of Israel’s settlements there. Sharon’s disengagement plan was heralded at the time as a defining moment in Israeli-Palestinian relations—a measure that would serve as a catalyst for change and revive the moribund peace process. Yet within months of Israel’s withdrawal from Gaza, completed in August 2005, the optimism generated by this move had evaporated, leading to further hardship and despair for the Palestinians in Gaza and to a marked deterioration in security for Israel. This chapter assesses the reasons for the failure of the disengagement plan. It asks whether Gaza disengagement plan was yet another missed opportunity for peace. Can this failure be attributed to a lack of policy planning and preparation? Or was Israel’s unilateral approach to its disengagement from Gaza fundamentally flawed?

Keywords: Gaza; Israel; Ariel Sharon; disengagement; settlements; unilateral withdrawal

Chapter.  7741 words. 

Subjects: International Relations

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