Governing Guns

Asif Efrat

in Governing Guns, Preventing Plunder

Published in print July 2012 | ISBN: 9780199760305
Published online September 2012 | e-ISBN: 9780199950010 | DOI:
Governing Guns

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This chapter tests the theoretical framework for the analysis of cooperation against illicit trade, developed in Chapter 2, empirically through an analysis of the international regulatory efforts against the illicit trade in small arms. It begins with a brief overview of the failed attempts to control the arms trade during the interwar period, followed by a discussion of the contemporary international efforts against small-arms proliferation and misuse. Next, it operationalizes the theoretical framework with respect to small arms and derives a set of expectations of government preferences. The expectations are tested through an original survey, based on interviewing officials from 118 countries. Quantitatively and qualitatively, the survey illuminates the variation in government preferences on international small-arms regulation. This is the first type of preference variation identified in Chapter 1: cross-country variation in preferences on the regulation of a given trade. The chapter then employs this variation to explain another variation: variation in the robustness of international regulation across trades. It accounts for the weakness of international small-arms regulation compared with international drug control and with the agreement against counterfeits (TRIPS). It also explains why small-arms control is weaker than other arms-control regimes, despite the fact that small arms are the deadliest weapons of all in terms of actual death toll.

Keywords: international regulation; arms control; counterfeiting; small-arms control

Chapter.  19327 words.  Illustrated.

Subjects: International Relations

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