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Asif Efrat

in Governing Guns, Preventing Plunder

Published in print July 2012 | ISBN: 9780199760305
Published online September 2012 | e-ISBN: 9780199950010 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199760305.003.0006
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The previous empirical chapters have all demonstrated the key problem hindering cooperation against illicit trade: international regulation aimed at curbing the trade exacts a heavy price from governments with little motivation to pay that price. These governments are not concerned about the trade's negative externalities; rather, they are protecting the interests of domestic actors involved in the trade. They are therefore reluctant to bear the burden and make the sacrifices that international regulation entails. As a result, an international political conflict ensues between governments supportive of regulation and governments opposed to it. This chapter explores the sources and dynamics of the international political conflicts over three types of illicit trade: drugs, money laundering, and counterfeits. The analysis highlights the commercial interests that have hindered international regulation and the exercise of American coercion to compel cooperation.

Keywords: political conflicts; illicit trade; drugs; money laundering; counterfeits; American coercion; international cooperation; international regulation

Chapter.  19949 words. 

Subjects: International Relations

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