Chapter

Russellian Monism II

Derk Pereboom

in Consciousness and the Prospects of Physicalism

Published in print March 2011 | ISBN: 9780199764037
Published online May 2011 | e-ISBN: 9780199895243 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199764037.003.0006

Series: Philosophy of Mind Series

Russellian Monism II

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In Chapter 6 I critically examine arguments by Kant and David Lewis for our lacking a significant sort of knowledge of absolutely intrinsic properties, whereupon I suggest and endorse an alternative argument for ignorance of this kind, one from failure of abduction. These ideas are refined by examining a recent controversy between Torin Alter and Daniel Stoljar. I close by drawing conclusions for an account of consciousness, and further historical overview that includes a discussion of Rudolf Carnap’s structuralism.

Keywords: Russellian monism; intrinsic property; absolutely intrinsic property; solidity; physicalism; panpsychism; protophenomenal; Leibniz; Kant; David Lewis; Rudolf Carnap

Chapter.  10009 words. 

Subjects: Philosophy of Mind

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